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Public Hedge Funds
Lin Sun and Melvyn Teo⇤
Abstract
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed
by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager
deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose
prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed
firms raise more capital and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted
firms. The results cannot be explained by endogeneity, backfill bias, serial correlation,
or manager manipulation, and are consistent with the view that, for asset management
firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment
capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.
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1. Introduction
“When a fund management company lists on a stock exchange, its clients are not uniformly
delighted. They are aware that potential conflicts of interest can arise that some companies
fail to manage.”
–The Financial Times, July 20121
In the recent years, we have witnessed a slew of public listings by mega asset management
firms including Amundi Group, Man Group, Fortress Investment Group, Och-Zi↵ Capital
Management Group, Blackstone Group, and KKR.2 These publicly listed mega asset man-
agers together managed an impressive US$1.95 trillion in 2016. How does the transition to
public equity markets impact investment performance? Fund management companies argue
that going public allows them to enhance investment performance by better incentivizing
their sta↵ through employee stock options, and by investing the IPO proceeds in superior
technology and business support. Moreover, listed firms may be operationally more robust
than their unlisted competitors given the higher transparency required of listed companies.
However, fund investors contend that public listing allows firm founders to sell o↵ their stakes
to outsiders, which exacerbates potential conflicts of interest. Indeed for asset managers, the
transition to public markets weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and invest-
ment capital, engendering a rich combination of agency problems, hitherto unexplored in
the academic literature, which could have significant implications for the fund investor. In
this paper, we shed light on these agency issues by investigating the impact on hedge fund
performance when asset management firms go public.
The hedge fund industry is an important and interesting laboratory for studying the
1See “Going public brings benefits and pitfalls,” The Financial Times, 22 July 2012, and “For private
equity clients, worries over public listing,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 June 2011.
2See for instance “Amundi IPO to create Europe’s biggest traded asset manager,” Bloomberg, 2 November
2015. By our estimates, at the end of 2013 about 16.68% of hedge fund industry assets were managed by
listed firms.
1
impact of initial public o↵erings in asset management.3 First, hedge funds, both public and
private, typically report monthly return data to commercial databases, allowing researchers
to cleanly measure investment performance and evaluate the performance implications of
the private to public transition. Second, it is di cult to run a comparable analysis on
private equity funds as performance metrics used in private equity such as IRR or investment
multiple are measured over a multi-year horizon, e↵ectively precluding researchers from
analyzing the performance implications of the transition in a timely fashion. Third, agency
problems are more salient for hedge funds than for mutual funds owing to the complex
strategies employed by and the lower level of transparency and disclosure of the former.4
Indeed, investors in hedge funds and private equity funds (and to a lesser extent mutual
funds) that are managed by publicly listed firms need to contend with a combination of
agency issues: the conflicts that surface between management and fund investors (Agarwal,
Daniel, and Naik, 2011; Teo, 2011; Aragon and Nanda, 2017) and the conflicts that arise
between firm shareholders and fund investors. In contrast, a privately held investment firm is
typically controlled by its founder-owners, who also invest a substantial portion of their net
worth in the funds managed by the firm.5 This engenders alignment between ownership, con-
trol, and investment capital. Post-IPO, the founders of the firm sell-out to new shareholders
who typically do not invest alongside the limited partners, thus separating ownership from
investment capital. Furthermore, the founders may not re-invest the substantial proceeds
from the IPO in the funds managed by the firm, thereby distancing control from investment
3According to BarclayHedge, hedge funds collectively managed over US$3 trillion in assets in 2016. See
https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/HF Money Under Management.html.
4Consistent with this view, Ferris and Yan (2009) find economically modest performance di↵erences
between mutual funds sorted by firm listing status that are not robust to the risk adjustment methodology.
For example, they find that the Fama and French (1993) alpha spread between mutual funds managed by
publicly listed firms and those managed by private firms is a modest –2.2 basis points per month and is
statistically indistinguishable from zero at the ten percent level. Unlike us, Ferris and Yan (2009) do not
establish the link between the underperformance and conflicts of interest. Instead, they assume that the
underperformance is itself supportive of the agency view.
5According to Luba Nikulina from Towers Watson, “Capital commitment by fund managers is the single
most important way to align the interests of managers and investors.” See “Skin in the game is crucial, but
how much?” Financial Times, 18 November 2012.
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capital.6 Fig. 1 illustrates the separation of ownership, control, and investment capital when
an investment firm goes public.
[Insert Fig. 1 here]
We find substantial di↵erences in expected returns on the portfolios of hedge funds sorted
by fund management company listing status that are unexplained by the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven factors. Hedge funds managed by listed firms underperform hedge funds man-
aged by unlisted firms by 2.89% per year (t-statistic = 4.73) after adjusting for co-variation
with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. The results are not confined to the smallest
funds in our sample and cannot be explained by di↵erences in share restrictions and illiquid-
ity (Aragon, 2007; Aragon and Strahan, 2012), incentives (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009),
fund age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), fund size (Berk and Green, 2004), return smoothing
behavior (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004), backfill and incubation bias (Liang, 2000;
Fung and Hsieh, 2009; Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst, 2014), and manager manipu-
lation of fund returns (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011; Aragon and Nanda, 2017).
Using a di↵erences-in-di↵erences analysis, we find that relative to the five-year pre-IPO
period, average fund risk-adjusted performance deteriorates by an annualized 13.68% while
average firm alpha wanes by an annualized 8.04% during the five-year post-IPO period.7
Despite the post-event underperformance, public firms harvest fee revenues that are US$6.36
million or 27.04% greater than do comparable private firms. This is because relative to the
control group, public firms are able to grow their assets under management (henceforth
AUM) by US$340.95 million or 61.49% during the same period. The surge in firm AUM
stems less from organic growth in existing fund AUM and more from the launch of new funds
post listing.
In line with an agency story that derives from conflicts between control and investment
6As a result of the windfall from the IPO, the proportion of the founders’ net worth that is co-invested
in the funds managed by the firm falls, even if the founders do not redeem from the funds post-IPO.
7The risk-adjusted underperformance of the hedge funds managed by listed firms in the portfolio sort
increases to 11.03% per annum when we confine the fund sample to that used in the event study.
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capital, we observe substantial di↵erences in the underperformance for funds sorted on met-
rics that capture the incentive alignment between management and investors. Specifically,
the alpha spread between funds managed by private versus public firms is smaller for funds
with high manager total deltas (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009), better governance scores
(Ozik and Sadka, 2015), and manager personal investment. In keeping with an explanation
that relates to conflicts between ownership and investment capital, the short-termist pres-
sures associated with a stock listing (Poterba and Summers, 1995; Graham, Harvey, and
Rajgopal, 2005; Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015) also drive the underperformance
of publicly traded asset management firms.8 We find that firms with high earnings response
coe cients or ERCs (Ball and Brown, 1968; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989), whose stock prices
are more responsive to earnings, underperform more than do firms with low ERCs. Moreover,
consistent with the overall conflicts of interest view, we find that underperformance is more
pronounced for firms that exhibit greater separation of ownership, control, and investment
capital post-IPO. Specifically, amongst listed firms, those with low insider ownership and
whose prospectuses reveal that existing shareholders will cash out post-IPO underperform
more.
The aforementioned conflicts of interest translate into fund underperformance via the
drive to gather assets post-IPO. Equity markets tend to reward revenue growth, which, for
investment firms, generally corresponds to growth in AUM (Pozen and Clay, 2012).9 Short-
termist pressures can also induce excessive asset gathering since asset gathering boosts cur-
rent fee revenues (or current earnings) at the expense of future returns (or future earnings).
Consistent with the asset gathering view, we find that the underperformance is most severe
for funds with the lowest liquidity risk exposure (Pa´stor and Stambaugh, 2003), and there-
8A focus on short-term quarterly earnings at publicly listed investment firms may hamper their ability to
attack long horizon mispricings (Stein, 2005), thereby limiting investment opportunity and reducing alpha.
9Man Group’s strategy is emblematic of this. According to Man Group’s Finance Director Kevin Hayes,
“the Board’s point of view is that at its essence the Man Group’s strategy is a growth strategy. We think
that’s why people invest in us. . . . And when we’re looking therefore at each aspect of our business, we have
to be able to grow it. We have to be able to scale it.” See Pozen and Clay (2012, p. 6).
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fore have the greatest capacity to gather assets.10 Additionally, we find that high ERC firms
raise more capital and launch more funds than do low ERC firms.
Given the greater transparency that is required of a listed firm, hedge funds managed
by listed firms may exhibit lower operational risk, thereby attracting investors despite the
underperformance. We show that, in line with this view, hedge funds managed by listed
firms are less likely to trigger three of the four most common performance flags observed
by Bollen and Pool (2012). Specifically, they are less likely to report return distributions
with a discontinuity at zero, a low number of negative returns, or a high number of repeated
returns.
The endogeneity of firm listing does not explain the underperformance of hedge funds
managed by public firms. By analyzing the private to public transition in the event study,
we sidestep concerns that time-invariant di↵erences between public and private firms simul-
taneously explain listing status and fund underperformance. The di↵erences-in-di↵erences
methodology ameliorates concerns that observable time-varying di↵erences in firm charac-
teristics drive our findings. To cater for unobserved time-varying di↵erences between public
and private firms, we run an instrumental variables analysis with the supply of investment
capital at firm founding as the instrument, and find that the impact of listing on fund per-
formance is even stronger after instrumenting for listing status. Our choice of instrument
follows Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) and is robust to alternative specifications.
The results in this paper challenge the view that asset management firms list to enhance
investment performance. In doing so, we resonate with three strands of research on hedge
funds. The first strand examines agency problems and finds that some hedge funds inflate
their December returns (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011), take on excessive liquidity risk
(Teo, 2011), and strategically delay reporting poor performance (Aragon and Nanda, 2017).11
10The advantage of our set up is that it captures ex-ante the intent to raise capital. Actual capital
raised ex-post is less useful for our purposes since it is both a function of past fund performance via the
flow-performance relationship and a determinant of future fund performance via capacity constraints
11Jorion and Schwarz (2014) argue that the discontinuity at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution
documented by Bollen and Pool (2009) is not evidence of manager manipulation.
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Our findings indicate that the process of going public heightens conflicts of interest, which in
turn hurt performance. A second strand sheds light on the drivers of alpha. We find that, just
like motivated (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009), emerging (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010),
distinctive (Sun, Wang, and Zheng, 2012), and attentive (Lu, Ray, and Teo, 2016) hedge
funds, those managed by private firms also outperform. The third strand uncovers strong
direct (Yin, 2016) and indirect (Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 2016) incentives that drive
managers to raise capital. Our results suggest that public firms are even more motivated to
gather assets.
This paper enriches the literature on initial public o↵erings. Going public crimps indus-
try competitor performance (Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl, 2010), biases issuers of credit ratings
(Kedia, Rajgopal, and Zhou, 2014), hurts firm internal innovation (Bernstein, 2015), and
reduces the sensitivity of corporate investment to opportunities (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and
Ljungqvist, 2015). Yet little is known about the e↵ect of going public on fund investment
performance. Our work addresses this important gap. Our findings are distinct from papers
that find that IPO firms su↵er from poor long-run post-issue operating performance (Jain
and Kini, 1994) and stock returns (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Unlike those papers, which
analyze the conflicts between shareholders and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Jensen, 1989), we focus on the conflicts between fund investors and management / share-
holders. We show that while listed asset managers deliver lower returns, which hurt fund
investors, they are able to grow fee revenues, which benefits shareholders.
Our work complements a nascent literature on ownership stakes in hedge funds, which
reports conflicting results on the performance of hedge funds with external owners. On one
hand, Mullally (2017) finds that hedge funds that sell significant ownership stakes to outsiders
do not underperform. He contends that external owners in general have strong incentives to
monitor their funds. On the other hand, Yan and Zheng (2017) show that conditional on
those outside owners being financial firms, hedge funds subsequently underperform, which
they attribute to a conflicts of interest story. In our sample, we exclude firms that go public
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simply because they are bought out by listed companies. Therefore, our results are not
driven by the external owner or by the financial firm a liation e↵ect. We argue that an IPO
o↵ers a more robust setting for investigating conflicts of interest in hedge fund firms given
that the new minority shareholders of a publicly listed firm typically neither invest in the
funds under management nor have control rights over the firm. Conversely, in an ownership
transfer, the new stakeholder often acquires control rights while simultaneously supplying
capital to the funds managed by the firm.12
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
methodology. Section 3 reports the empirical results while Section 4 presents a battery of
robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
We evaluate hedge funds using monthly net-of-fee returns and assets under management
data of live and dead hedge funds reported in the TASS, HFR, and BarclayHedge datasets
from January 1994 to December 2013. Because TASS, HFR, and BarclayHedge started
distributing their data in 1994, the data sets do not contain information on funds that died
before January 1994. This gives rise to survivorship bias. We mitigate this bias by focusing
on data from January 1994 onward.
In our fund universe, we have a total of 30,509 hedge funds, of which 12,380 are live
funds and 18,129 are dead funds. However, due to concerns that funds with multiple share
classes could cloud the analysis, we exclude duplicate share classes from the sample.13 This
leaves a total of 16,592 hedge funds, of which 5,947 are live funds and 10,645 are dead funds
at the end of our sample period. The funds are roughly evenly split between TASS, HFR,
and BarclayHedge. While 5,547 funds appear in multiple databases, many funds belong to
12See, for example, the seed relationships described in Cohen and Delacey (2005, p. 7).
13Inferences do not change when we include multiple share classes of the same fund in the analysis. To
merge databases, we follow the procedure outlined in the Appendix of Joenva¨a¨ra¨, Kosowski, and Tolonen
(2017).
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only one database. Specifically, there are 3,597, 3,446, and 4,002 funds unique to the TASS,
HFR, and BarclayHedge databases, respectively. This highlights the advantage of obtaining
data from more than one source. In addition to monthly return and size information, our
sample also captures data on fund characteristics such as management fee, performance fee,
redemption period, lock-up period, investment style, leverage indicator, high-water mark
indicator, and fund age.14
Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), we classify funds into four broad investment
styles: Security Selection, Multi-process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. Security
Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued securities, re-
spectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take positions in equity
markets. Multi-process funds employ multiple strategies that take advantage of opportuni-
ties created by significant transactional events, such as spin-o↵s, mergers and acquisitions,
bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional Trader funds
bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the
futures and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between
prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure.
We hand collect the fund management companies’ public listing status from several
sources: S&P Capital IQ, the SEC’s Investment Adviser Public Disclosure website, Factiva,
and the fund management companies’ websites.15 Specifically, for each fund management
company, we perform a search in S&P Capital IQ and SEC’s Investment Adviser Public
Disclosure, which provide information about the company’s current and prior corporate par-
ents. Once we identify a parent and subsidiary relationship, we obtain the e↵ective public
listing date for the fund management company by checking the “M&A/Private Placements”
section in S&P Capital IQ, conducting a Factiva news search, and perusing the corporate
14To ameliorate the impact of return outliers, we trim the hedge fund returns in our sample at the 99.5th
and 0.5th percentiles. The baseline results are virtually unchanged when we use the original returns reported
in the databases or when we winsorize the returns at the 99.5th and 0.5th percentiles.
15See http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Search/iapd Search.aspx for the SEC’s Investment
Adviser Public Disclosure website.
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history from the fund management company’s website.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the number of listed firms as well as the number of
hedge funds and the assets that they manage. While the number of listed fund management
companies is small relative to the number of unlisted fund management companies, listed
fund management companies manage a growing number of hedge funds and pool of assets.
In 1994, there were only 12 listed firms managing 39 hedge funds and US$2.55 billion or
4.02% of industry assets. In 2013, the number of listed firms has grown to 113. These firms
manage 856 hedge funds and US$199.34 billion or 16.68% of industry assets, a significant
increase relative to the start of the sample period.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Our firm sample covers a broad spectrum of fund management companies including large
asset management houses that also manage private equity funds and mutual funds. This
allows us to shed light on the impact of public listing on the asset management industry
in general. One concern is that for some of these firms, their hedge fund assets may be a
relatively small part of their business. Consequently, the impact of hedge fund performance,
fee revenues, and AUM on these firms may be relatively muted. To ameliorate such concerns,
as a robustness test, we follow Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and discard firms for whom
hedge fund assets only make up a small part of their aggregated institutional portfolio. We
first check whether a firm is registered as an investment adviser with the SEC. Registration is
a prerequisite for conducting non-hedge fund business. If a firm is not registered, we include
it in our pure play sample. If a firm is registered, we obtain its registration documents
(Form ADV). For a registered firm to be included in our pure play hedge fund firm sample,
we require that (a) that it charges performance-based fees, and (b) at least 50% of its clients
are “Other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)” or “High net worth individuals”.
This leaves us with a total of 96 listed and 1,888 unlisted pure play firms at the end of the
sample period. In results that are available upon request, we find that our baseline results
prevail when we analyze only pure play hedge fund firms.
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Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Liang, 2000; Fung and Hsieh, 2009).
These biases stem from the fact that inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a
result, there is a self-selection bias. For instance, funds often undergo an incubation period
during which they rely on internal funding before seeking capital from outside investors. In-
cubated funds with successful track records then go on to list in various hedge fund databases
while the unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an incubation bias. Separate from this, when
a fund is listed on a database, it often includes data prior to the listing date. Again, because
successful funds have a strong incentive to list and attract capital inflows, these backfilled
returns tend to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. In the analysis that follows, we
will repeat the tests after dropping the first 24 months of return data from each fund to
ensure that the results are robust to backfill and incubation bias. To fully address concerns
about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, we also
redo the tests after removing all return observations that have been backfilled prior to fund
listing date.
Throughout this paper, we model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the Stan-
dard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed
as the di↵erence between the Russell 2000 and the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 indices;
the yield spread of the US ten-year Treasury bond over the three-month Treasury bill, ad-
justed for duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of
Moody’s BAA bond over the ten-year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for du-
ration (BAAMTSY); and the excess returns on portfolios of look back straddle options on
currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are con-
structed to replicate the maximum possible return from trend following strategies (Fung and
Hsieh, 2001) on their respective underlying assets. These seven factors have been shown by
Fung and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund returns.
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3. Empirical results
3.1. Tests of fund performance
To begin, we test for di↵erences in risk-adjusted performance between funds managed by
listed and unlisted management companies. Every year, starting in January 1994, two hedge
fund portfolios are formed by sorting funds on management company listing status. The
post-formation returns on these two portfolios over the next 12 months are linked across
years to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate the performance of
the portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.
The results, reported in Panel A of Table 2, reveal substantial di↵erences in expected
returns, on the portfolios sorted by management company listing status, that are unexplained
by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Hedge funds managed by listed companies
underperform those managed by unlisted firms by a statistically significant but modest 1.89%
per year (t-statistic = 3.13). After adjusting for co-variation with the factors from the Fung
and Hsieh (2004) model, the spread increases to an economically significant 2.89% per year
(t-statistic = 4.73).16 As in the rest of the paper, we base statistical inferences on White
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Since hedge funds with investor capital
below US$20 million may not be relevant to large institutional investors, we also conduct the
portfolio sort on the sample of hedge funds with at least US$20 million of AUM. The results
reported in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that our findings are not driven by small funds.17
[Insert Table 2 and Fig. 2 here]
Fig. 2 complements the results from Panel A of Table 2. It illustrates the monthly
16The portfolio sort results are robust to value-weighting the funds within each portfolio. The risk-adjusted
spread for the value-weighted sort is 2.75% per annum (t-statistic = 4.20).
17The portfolio sort results are not driven solely by the underperformance of funds launched post IPO by
listed firms. We redo our portfolio sort with only funds that were conceived prior to firm listing and find that
these funds post firm IPO underperform funds managed by unlisted firms by 2.54% per year after adjusting
for risk (t-statistic = 2.72). We note that funds launched post IPO underperform funds launched pre IPO,
but the performance spread is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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cumulative abnormal returns (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of funds managed by
listed firms (portfolio A) and the portfolio of funds managed by unlisted firms (portfolio B).
CAR is the cumulative di↵erence between a portfolio’s excess return and its factor loadings
(estimated over the entire sample period) multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk
factors. The CARs in Fig. 2 indicate that portfolio A consistently underperforms portfolio
B over the entire sample period and suggest that the underperformance of funds managed
by listed firms is not peculiar to a particular year.
There may be concerns that the portfolio sort results are driven by shareholder activists
as activists that are managed by listed firms may be less willing to exert strong pressure
on portfolio companies to make shareholder-friendly changes given that they themselves
are vulnerable to shareholder activism. To address such concerns, we identify shareholder
activist funds in our sample based on strategy name, substrategy name, fund name, and
fund investment strategy description. In total, we have 95 shareholder activist funds in our
sample. After removing shareholder activists, we find that funds managed by listed firms
still underperform those managed by unlisted firms by 2.85% per annum (t-statistic = 4.66)
after adjusting for risk.
To further test the performance di↵erence between funds managed by listed and unlisted
management companies, we estimate the following pooled OLS regression:
ALPHAim = a+bLISTEDim+cMGTFEEi+dPERFFEEi+eNOTICEi+fMININVi
+ glog(SIZEim 1) + hAGEim +
X
k
pkSTY LEDUMki +
X
l
qlY EARDUM lim + ✏im, (1)
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away co-variation with the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, LISTED is an indicator variable that takes a value of
one when a fund is managed by a listed firm and a value of zero otherwise, MGTFEE is fund
management fee in percentage, PERFFEE is fund performance fee in percentage, NOTICE
is fund redemption notification period in months, MININV is fund minimum investment
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in millions of US$, SIZE is fund AUM in millions of US$, AGE is fund age in decades,
STYLEDUM is the fund style dummy, and YEARDUM is the year dummy. To estimate
fund alpha, we use the past 24 months of return data.18 We also estimate the analogous
regression on raw monthly fund returns to ensure that our findings are not artefacts of the
risk adjustment methodology.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The results from the cross-sectional regression analysis, reported in columns one to four
of Table 3, corroborate the findings from the portfolio sorts. Specifically, the coe cient
estimate on LISTED in the alpha regression reported in column four of Table 3 indicates
that, controlling for other factors that could explain fund performance, funds managed by
listed companies underperform funds managed by unlisted companies by 2.44% per annum
after adjusting for risk. Inferences do not change when we estimate the regression on raw
returns suggesting that our prior findings are not driven by our risk adjustment technol-
ogy. The coe cient estimates on the control variables accord with the extant literature.
Higher-powered incentives or performance fees (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009) and longer
redemption notice periods (Aragon, 2007) are associated with superior performance, while
fund age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010) is linked to poorer performance. The impact of fund
size on performance is more ambiguous. While size is associated with lower returns (Berk
and Green, 2004), it is also linked to higher alphas.19
To check for robustness, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in place of
the OLS regressions. Specifically, first we run cross-sectional regressions for each month.
Then, we report the time-series averages of the coe cient estimates, and use the time-series
standard errors of the average slopes to draw inferences. The Fama and MacBeth regressions
control for correlation in residuals across di↵erent firms within the same month. We compute
18Inferences do not change when we estimate fund alpha using the past 36 months of returns instead.
19Diseconomies of scale at the firm level do not explain our findings. In unreported results that are
available upon request, we show that the pooled OLS regression findings are robust to including the log of
lagged firm AUM as an additional independent variable.
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Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a three-month lag to adjust for dependence
across time. The Fama and MacBeth (1973) results reported in columns five to eight of
Table 3 echo our previous findings and indicate that they are robust to alternative model
specifications.
One concern is that funds managed by listed firms may take on less leverage than do
funds managed by unlisted firms. This may explain the underperformance of the former
relative to the latter. To address this concern, we re-estimate the Eq. (1) regressions with
fund information ratio in place of fund alpha. Information ratio is fund alpha divided by
the standard deviation of fund residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model estimated
over the past 24 months. In results that are available upon request, we find that the coef-
ficient estimates on LISTED in the OLS regressions on information ratio are negative and
statistically significant at the one percent level. After controlling for the other factors that
may drive fund information ratio, funds managed by listed firms deliver information ratios
that are on average 0.215 lower than do funds managed by unlisted firms. Inferences do not
change when we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions on fund information ratio.
3.2. Event study
To complement the baseline portfolio sorts, we conduct an event study to investigate fund
performance and AUM before and after firm listing. We choose as the event window the
period starting 60 months prior to the IPO and ending 60 months after the IPO.20 To be
included in the sample, a fund must have monthly return information during the period that
starts 24 months pre IPO and ends 24 months post IPO. This leaves us with 58 funds that
belong to 27 firms with su cient return information. To account for endogeneity concerns
driven by observable di↵erences between listed and unlisted firms, we match event hedge
funds with non-event hedge funds based on fund performance and AUM in the 24-month
pre-IPO period and conduct a di↵erences-in-di↵erences analysis. For example, in the fund
20Our di↵erences-in-di↵erences results are robust to using an event window that starts 48 months prior to
the IPO and ends 48 months after the IPO.
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alpha analysis, event funds are matched to non-event funds by minimizing the sum of the
absolute percentage di↵erences in monthly fund alpha in the 24-month pre-IPO period.
Panel A of Table 4 reports di↵erences in fund alpha and AUM before and after the IPO
relative to the matched sample. We also match event firms with non-event firms based on
firm performance, firm AUM, firm revenue, and number of funds per firm, and report the
results from di↵erences-in-di↵erences analyses of these firm attributes in Panel B of Table
4.21
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here]
The results reported in Table 4 indicate that relative to the five-year period before IPO
and to a matched sample of funds, fund risk-adjusted performance deteriorates by an an-
nualized 13.68% during the five-year period following the IPO.22 The reduction in fund
performance is economically meaningful and statistically significant at the one percent level.
At the same time and relative to comparable firms, listed firm risk-adjusted performance
wanes by an annualized 8.04%. These results suggest that the drop in performance may be
driven more by the smaller funds managed by listed firms.
Do the lower alphas of listed firms translate into lower fee revenues for these asset man-
agement companies? We find that despite the deterioration in performance, relative to their
unlisted competitors, listed firms harvest fee revenues that are US$6.36 million or 27.04%
greater post listing. This is because compared to the control group, they grow their AUM
by US$340.95 million or 61.49% during the same period. The surge in firm AUM stems
less from organic growth in existing fund AUM and more from the launch of new funds
post listing. After listing, existing fund AUM ratchets up by US$144 million, but the AUM
increase is still lower than that for funds in the control group. At the same time, the number
21Inferences do not change when we use a propensity score-matching model to match event funds and
firms with non-event funds and firms.
22To reconcile the results from the event study (Table 4) with those of the portfolio sort (Table 2), we
rerun the portfolio sort with only funds from the event study sample, i.e., funds with at least 24 months
of return information pre- and post-firm IPO. The results indicate that for this group of funds, the alpha
spread between funds managed by unlisted firms and those managed by listed firms is 11.03% per annum.
This is consistent with the magnitude of the alpha spread reported in Table 4.
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of funds per firm increases from 3.34 to 6.37, which is 2.77 funds per firm greater than for
comparable firms.
Are listed firms more likely to conceive additional hedge funds after controlling for other
factors that drive fund launch? To investigate, we estimate probit regressions on the proba-
bility of launching a new hedge fund in a given year. We include as independent variables an
indicator variable for whether a firm is listed, as well as controls for past firm performance
over the previous year, the number of funds already launched by the firm, standard deviation
of monthly firm returns over the previous year, aggregate firm flow over the previous year,
firm management fee, firm performance fee, firm notice period, firm minimum investments,
firm age, and the log of firm size. Firm management fee is simply the value-weighted average
management fee of the funds managed by the firm. The other firm attributes are constructed
analogously.
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that firms are more likely to raise additional
funds post-IPO. The marginal e↵ects from the regression with firm return as a control
variable indicate that listing increases the probability that a firm will launch a new fund
by 3.27 percentage points. In any given year, the unconditional probability that a firm will
launch a new fund is 10.67 percentage points; so listing increases the chance that a firm will
raise a new fund by 30.65%. The coe cient estimates on the other independent variables
yield interesting insights. They indicate that firms that are larger, are younger, set more
investor-friendly redemption notification terms, and conceived many funds before are more
likely to launch additional funds.
3.3. Conflicts between investment capital and control
The results in the previous subsection are consistent with the view that principal-agent prob-
lems drive fund behavior around firm IPOs. To investigate further, we stratify funds based on
metrics that moderate conflicts between fund management and investors at hedge funds, and
redo the portfolio sorts. First, we condition on fund manager total delta. Agarwal, Daniel,
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and Naik (2009) argue that managers who are operating close to their high watermarks, and
hence have higher manager total deltas, are more aligned with their investors. Second, we
condition on the Ozik and Sadka (2015) governance measure, which is based on whether a
fund is an onshore fund, features a high watermark, is registered with the SEC, was audited
in the past, and employs a top auditor or legal counsel.23 As per Ozik and Sadka (2015),
we group funds into high aggregate governance funds, i.e., funds with aggregate governance
scores greater than or equal to four (out of five), and low aggregate governance funds, i.e.,
funds with aggregate governance scores less than or equal to one (out of five). Third, we
condition on fund manager personal investment, which aligns manager interests with those of
investors and has been used by researchers to study conflicts of interest in hedge funds (see,
for example, Brown et al. (2009)). Higher manager total deltas, better fund governance,
and manager personal investment, should ameliorate the agency problems faced by listed
asset management firms and therefore help narrow the investment performance gap between
listed and unlisted firms.
We report in Panels A to C of Table 6 the results from the baseline portfolio sorts after
stratifying funds by the above-mentioned metrics. We find that the alpha spreads between
funds managed by listed and unlisted firms are smaller for funds with greater incentive
alignment, i.e., funds with high manager total deltas, better governance, and manager co-
investment. These results lend credence to the view that the underperformance of listed
firms is partly driven by the conflicts between control and investment capital.
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 here]
3.4. Conflicts between investment capital and ownership
Is the underperformance of funds managed by listed firms also driven by the conflicts between
fund investors and firm shareholders? The short-termist pressures associated with stock
23See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of 100 largest law firms by revenue for the top law firms and
http://www.accountingmajors.com/accountingmajors/articles/top100.html for the top accounting firms.
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listings could induce the underperformance of public asset management firms. An emphasis
on short-term quarterly earnings at public investment firms would hamper their ability to
correct long horizon mispricings in the market (Stein, 2005), forcing them to focus instead
on short horizon mispricings, thereby limiting investment opportunity and reducing alpha.
To test, we follow Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) and compute earnings
response coe cients or ERCs (Ball and Brown, 1968; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). ERCs
measure the sensitivity of stock returns to firm earnings. We compute ERCs using firm
level regressions for all listed firms with at least eight quarters of earnings information from
I/B/E/S. To increase the precision of our estimates and conserve the number of observations,
firm ERCs are estimated using information that span the full sample period. If short-
termism explains fund underperformance, then we should find that the underperformance is
concentrated in funds managed by firms with high ERCs.
Table 7 reports the excess returns and alphas of portfolios of hedge funds managed by
listed firms with high versus low ERCs. The sample period for the sort extends from January
2000 to December 2013 and corresponds to the period where there are at least ten funds in
each of the high ERC and low ERC fund portfolios. We find indeed that high ERC firms
drive the underperformance of funds managed by listed firms. Specifically, after adjusting for
covariation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the high ERC portfolio (Portfolio
A1) underperforms the unlisted portfolio (Portfolio B) by 2.68% per year (t-statistic = 3.13)
while the low ERC portfolio (Portfolio A2) delivers a risk-adjusted return that is statistically
indistinguishable from that of the unlisted portfolio.
3.5. Separation of investment capital, ownership, and control post-IPO
If the separation of investment capital, ownership, and control truly drives the underperfor-
mance of funds managed by listed firms, we should observe that the results are strongest
for funds belonging to public firms where the founders unloaded most of their stakes. In
such firms, the level of insider ownership will be low. Therefore, we argue that public firms
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with few insider owners and few closely held shares experience the greatest separation of
ownership, control, and investment capital. Next, we sort funds managed by listed firms
based on the number of insider owners and the number of closely held shares. We obtain
data on insider owners from Form ADV Schedule A and B, and information on closely held
shares from Datastream. We define an insider owner as a member of the fund management
team who owns, either directly or indirectly, at least five percent of the fund management
company.
The sort results reported in Panels D and E of Table 6 indicate that, relative to funds
managed by unlisted firms, hedge funds managed by listed firms with no insider owners
underperform by 2.58% per annum (t-statistic = 3.16) after adjusting for risk, while those
managed by listed firms with at least one insider owner outperform by 0.05% per annum
(t-statistic = 0.02) after adjusting for risk. Similarly, relative to funds managed by unlisted
firms, funds managed by listed firms with few closely held shares (as a proportion of the
total number of shares outstanding) underperform more than do funds managed by listed
firms with many closely held shares. The risk-adjusted underperformance of the former is
3.44% per annum (t-statistic = 5.07) while that of the latter is 2.31% per annum (t-statistic
= 2.67). These results buttress the conflicts of interest view.
To further investigate the view, we sort funds managed by listed firms based on whether
they reveal in their IPO prospectuses that their existing shareholders will cash out. We obtain
IPO prospectuses from the Perfect Information filings database. Out of the 41 investment
firms for which we have prospectuses, 23 firms reveal either directly or indirectly that existing
shareholders will cash out during the IPO. The results reported in Panel F of Table 6 indicate
that, in line with the conflicts of interest explanation, the underperformance is driven by
listed firms whose existing shareholders cashed out during the IPO. After adjusting for risk,
funds managed by listed firms where existing shareholders cashed out underperform funds
managed by unlisted firms by 4.58% per year (t-statistic = 2.86), while those managed
by listed firms where existing shareholders did not cash out underperform their unlisted
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competitors by a modest 0.27% per year (t-statistic = 0.35).
3.6. Asset gathering
How do the conflicts of interest that surface post-IPO engender fund underperformance?
Fund management companies that go public may underperform as they are focused on gath-
ering assets and therefore are either less motivated to build on their successful track records
(since they are busy exploiting them) or are simply distracted by the demands associated
with growing their businesses. Researchers have shown that manager motivation (Agarwal,
Daniel, and Naik, 2009; Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010) and inattention (Lu, Ray, and Teo,
2016) impact performance. Recent work has argued that in the absence of personal capital
there are strong direct (Yin, 2016) and indirect (Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 2016) incen-
tives that drive hedge fund managers to raise capital. Equity markets tend to reward revenue
growth and for investment firms, revenue growth generally corresponds to growth in AUM.
Moreover, capital markets value stable and predictable earnings. This may encourage asset
management firms to trade volatile performance fee revenues for relatively stable manage-
ment fee revenues by growing AUM (Pozen and Clay, 2012). Indeed, we find from the results
in Table 4 that relative to their unlisted counterparts, listed firms raise more capital and are
more likely launch new funds.
We argue that for the asset gathering view to hold, underperformance must be concen-
trated amongst funds that have the greatest scope or potential for gathering assets. Hedge
funds that take on lower liquidity risk, are less susceptible to capacity constraints (Berk and
Green, 2004), and therefore have greater potential for gathering assets. Therefore, we sort
funds based on their liquidity risk as captured by fund historical Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003) liquidity beta and redo the baseline portfolio sorts. Fund historical liquidity beta is
estimated in the presence of the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, using the
past 24 months of data. Five hedge fund groups are formed every January 1, starting in
1996, based on fund historical Pa´stor and Stambaugh liquidity beta. Next, for each of these
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five groups, hedge funds are sorted into two portfolios based on fund management company
listing status. The post-formation returns on these ten portfolios during the next 12 months
are linked across years to form a single return series for each portfolio.
Table 8 reports the baseline portfolio sorts on five groups of funds stratified by fund
historical Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta. Consistent with the asset gathering
view, the performance di↵erential between funds managed by listed firms and those managed
by unlisted firms is greatest for funds that take on lower liquidity risk and therefore, have
fewer constraints on growth. Specifically, after adjusting for covariation with the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the underperformance of the funds managed by listed firms
(relative to those managed by unlisted firms) is 6.66% per annum (t-statistic = 4.81) for
funds in the lowest liquidity beta quintile but only 2.89% per annum (t-statistic = 1.64) for
funds in the highest liquidity beta quintile.
The advantage of our set up is that it captures ex-ante the intent to raise capital. Actual
capital raised ex-post is less useful for our purposes since it is both a function of past
fund performance (Agarwal, Green, and Ren, 2017) via the flow-performance relationship
and a determinant of future fund performance via capacity constraints. Nonetheless, in
untabulated results, we also sort funds managed by listed firms into portfolios based on the
firm annualized AUM percentage growth post IPO and find that the underperformance is
concentrated in funds managed by firms that have aggressively raised capital post IPO. Funds
managed by firms with above median AUM growth post IPO underperform funds managed
by unlisted firms by 3.21% per annum (t-statistic = 3.96) after adjusting for risk. Conversely,
funds managed by firms with below median AUM growth post IPO only underperform funds
managed by unlisted firms by 0.99% per annum (t-statistic = 0.84) after accounting for risk.
Short-termist pressures can also induce excessive asset gathering since asset gathering
boosts current fee revenues (or current firm earnings) at the expense of future returns (or
future earnings). In results that are available upon request, we find using a probit regression
on the probability of fund launch post firm listing that, in any given year, high ERC firms
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are 37% more likely to launch new funds than are low ERC firms. Furthermore, high ERC
firms raise more capital than do low ERC firms. Indeed, in spite of their underperformance,
high ERC firms manage on average US$789.47 million more than do low ERC firms.
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 here]
3.7. Operational risk
Why do investors continue to subscribe to hedge funds managed by listed firms in light of the
underperformance? One view is that given the transparency that is required of a publicly
listed firm, funds managed by listed firms exhibit lower operational risk. Therefore, investors
in such funds may be trading investment performance for lower operational risk.
To investigate, we leverage on work by Bollen and Pool (2012) who identify performance
flags that are associated with the risk that a hedge fund is a fraud. We focus on the four
performance flags with the highest rejection rates for reporting violations in the Bollen and
Pool (2012) sample.24 They are (i) Kink, which is triggered when a fund reports a return
distribution with a discontinuity at zero, (ii) Maxrsq, which is triggered when a fund has
an adjusted R-squared that is not significantly di↵erent from zero, (iii) % Negative, which
is activated when a fund reports a low number of negative returns, (iv) % Repeat, which is
activated when a fund reports a high number of repeated returns. We report in Table 9, the
percentage of hedge funds grouped by firm listing that set o↵ any one of the above-mentioned
performance flags at the ten percent significance level, as well as the di↵erence in rejection
frequencies between the two groups of funds.
Table 9 indicates that hedge funds managed by listed firms are less likely to set o↵ three
of the four performance flags. Specifically, funds managed by listed firms compare favorably
to funds managed by unlisted firms based on Kink, % Negative, and % Repeat. They are
3.6% less likely to report distributions with a discontinuity at zero, 3.2% less likely to report
a low number of negative returns, and 7.7% less likely to report a high number of repeated
24See Panel B of Table 5 in Bollen and Pool (2012).
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returns. Moreover, the di↵erences in rejection rates are statistically significant at the one
percent level for these three indicators of fraud risk.
3.8. Endogeneity of firm listing status
Does the endogeneity of firm listing engender the underperformance of hedge funds managed
by public firms? Systematic di↵erences may exist between firms that list and those that
do not. These di↵erences could impact both the propensity to list and fund investment
performance. The event study in Section 3.2., by analyzing within firm variation in listing
status, addresses concerns that the spread in investment performance may be driven by
time-invariant di↵erences between private and public firms. Furthermore, the di↵erences-in-
di↵erences methodology that we employ in the event study allows us to ameliorate concerns
that observed time-varying di↵erences between listed and unlisted firms explain our results.
Still, the event study leaves open the possibility that unobserved time-varying di↵erences
between public and private firms might simultaneously a↵ect the decision to go public and
fund investment performance. To address this concern, we conduct an instrumental variables
analysis. The instrument that we use, i.e., firm strategy flow at founding, is motivated by
Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist’s (2015) choice of venture capital supply at founding to
instrument for firm listing status. Firm strategy flow at founding is the strategy flow of the
first fund conceived by the firm in the two-year period post firm inception.25 We argue that
the ability to attract capital at inception allows a firm to quickly reach critical mass and sets
the stage for a possible public listing several years later. The first-stage results in Column 1
of Table 10 confirm this prediction. The supply of capital around the time of firm founding
is a positive and significant predictor of a firm’s listing status with an F -statistic of 27.30.
The exclusion restriction is that conditional on covariates, firm strategy flow in the two-
25Specifically, Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) use as their instrument the total number of firms
receiving first-round venture capital funding in a firm’s headquarter state two years after a firm was funded.
Likewise, we use firm strategy flow in the two-year period after firm inception. We obtain similar inferences
when we use firm strategy flow during the one-year period before inception or firm strategy flow during the
one-year period after inception as alternative instruments.
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year period after inception only a↵ects fund investment performance through its impact
on a firm’s listing status. One concern is that early firm strategy flow may drive future
strategy returns via strategy-level capacity constraints (Naik, Ramadorai, and Stro¨mqvist,
2007). However, the median firm age at listing in our sample of eight years helps alleviate
this concern.26 Capital accumulation between six to eight years earlier should have little
impact on a fund’s investment performance today. As in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001) and Glaeser, Kerr, and Kerr (2015), we rely on the separation of time to motivate
the exclusion requirement. In unreported results, we find that higher strategy flow over the
last two years is not a reliable harbinger of lower future strategy returns. Therefore, our use
of strategy flow as opposed to AUM allows us to sidestep concerns related to strategy-level
capacity constraints.
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 10, we report the second stage results for the fund return
and alpha equations, respectively. After instrumenting for firm listing status, hedge funds
managed by publicly listed firms continue to underperform those managed by private firms.
A comparison to the equivalent na¨ıve OLS estimates in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 10 indicates
that the point estimates are larger in absolute terms after instrumenting for listing status.
These findings suggest that endogeneity is unlikely to drive our results.
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 here]
4. Robustness tests
In this section, we conduct a battery of robustness tests to ascertain the strength of our
empirical results.
26For the instrumental variables analysis, to accommodate our choice of instrument, we remove all firms
that list within two years of firm inception.
24
4.1. Backfill bias
Funds managed by unlisted firms may backfill their returns more often than do funds man-
aged by listed firms. In response to concerns about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, Gorton,
and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, we confine the analysis to TASS and HFR funds for
which we have the date that the fund listed on the databases (only TASS and HFR provide
this information). Next, we redo the baseline Table 2 portfolio sort for this subset of funds
and for those returns at or after the respective fund listing date. As there are not enough
funds with returns post-listing in the cross-section during the earlier years, we perform the
analysis for the period after 1996. As shown in Panel A of Table 11, our inferences remain
unchanged when we control for backfill bias in this fashion. As an alternative, we also remove
the first 24 months of returns for all funds to adjust for backfill and incubation bias. The
portfolio alpha spread remains economically meaningful and statistically significant at the
one percent level.
4.2. Serial correlation
Serial correlation in fund returns could arise from linear interpolation of prices for infre-
quently traded securities, the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, or deliberate performance-
smoothing behavior. This could inflate some of the test statistics that we use to make infer-
ences. To allay such concerns, we unsmooth fund returns using the algorithm of Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov (2004) and redo the Table 2 portfolio sort. The results reported in Panel
B of Table 11 indicate that our findings are not driven by serial correlation.
4.3. Pre-fee returns
Hedge fund returns are reported net of fees. If funds managed by listed firms charge higher
fees than do funds managed by unlisted firms, this may explain the underperformance of
the former. To check, we follow the algorithm outlined in Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel,
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and Naik (2009) and back out pre-fee fund returns. As shown in Panel C of Table 11, the
baseline portfolio sort spreads are even greater when we analyze pre-fee fund returns.
4.4. Dynamic risk exposures
One concern is that the beta loadings of the fund portfolios might not stay constant over
time. As a result, the risk-adjustment may not be accurate. To account for dynamic factor
loadings, we calculate the factor loadings using a rolling 24-month window and use those
factor loadings to calculate abnormal returns one month forward. The results reported in
Panel D of Table 11 indicate that inferences remain unchanged after catering for dynamic
risk exposures.
4.5. Omitted risk factors
The presence of additional risk factors could cloud inferences from the portfolio sort analysis.
Relative to funds managed by listed firms, those managed by unlisted firms could be loading
up more on some risk factor (e.g., emerging markets) that did well over the sample period.
To ameliorate such concerns, we augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with an emerging
markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index return. To cater for exposure
to option-based strategies (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001), we also augment the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) model with the out-of-the-money S&P 500 call and put option-based factors from the
Agarwal and Naik (2004) model. Finally, to account for exposure to liquidity risk (Teo,
2011; Aragon and Strahan, 2012; Sadka, 2012), we supplement the Fung and Hsieh model
with the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. The results presented in Panels E,
F, and G of Table 11 indicate that our baseline results are not driven by the presence of
omitted risk factors.
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4.6. Fund termination
There are concerns that because funds that terminated their operations may have stopped
reporting returns prematurely, the portfolio alphas are biased upward. To allay such con-
cerns, we assume that, for the month after a fund liquidates, its return is –10%. Thereafter,
money is reallocated to the remaining funds in the portfolio. As shown in Panel H of Table
11, with the adjustment for fund termination, the alphas of the portfolios in the baseline sort
fall but the spread remains economically and statistically significant. We also experiment
with more extreme termination returns of –20% and –30%, and obtain qualitatively similar
results.
4.7. Subsample analysis
To understand how the underperformance of funds managed by listed firms varies over time,
we split the sample period into two subperiods: January 1994 to December 2003 and January
2004 to December 2013. Next, we redo the Table 2 portfolio sort for each subperiod. The
results in Panels I and J of Table 11 indicate that our findings are robust across subperiods.
4.8. Manager manipulation of fund returns
Funds managed by listed firms, due to the higher level of transparency required of them,
may be less inclined to inflate their returns than are funds managed by unlisted firms. This
may explain the apparent underperformance of the former when we analyze self-reported
returns from commercial hedge fund databases. To address this concern, we construct firm
returns from firm stock holdings reported in the Thomson Financial 13-F holdings data.
We argue that there is less scope for manipulation in the verifiable 13-F filings data that
are reported to the SEC. The baseline portfolio sort results from returns derived from stock
holdings data are presented in Panel L of Table 11. Since these results are constructed at
the firm level, we also present the baseline portfolio sort results from firm returns in Panel K
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of Table 11 for comparison. The number of firms at the end of our sample falls by 88% when
we analyze the sample of firm returns derived from stock holdings data.27 Nonetheless, the
results reported in Panel L of Table 11 indicate that our findings are robust to adjusting for
manager manipulation of hedge fund returns.
Another way to address manager manipulation is to use the manipulation-proof perfor-
mance measure (henceforth MPPM) proposed by Goetzmann et al. (2007). In that e↵ort,
we compute MPPM for the hedge funds in our sample based on rolling 24 months of return
information and redo the baseline Eq. (1) regressions with fund MPPM in place of fund
alpha. We find that, for all values of ⇢ 2 {2, 3, 4} used in the computation of MPPM, the
coe cient estimates on LISTED in the OLS and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions are
positive and statistically di↵erent from zero at the one percent level.
5. Conclusion
Our empirical results challenge the view that asset management firms go public to enhance
investment performance. They indicate that, for an asset management firm, the process of
going public separates investment capital from ownership and control, precipitating conflicts
of interest that hurt investors.
We show that hedge funds managed by listed asset management firms consistently under-
perform funds managed by their unlisted competitors after adjusting for risk. The results are
partly driven by problems that surface from the separation of control and investment capital
in a publicly listed firm. Hedge funds that align management and investment capital, such
as funds with high manager total deltas, better governance, and manager co-investment,
underperform less when their management companies go public. The results are also driven
27This is because our sample of hedge funds also includes funds that invest exclusively in non-US equities
such as European focused funds as well as small equity long/short funds that have less than US$100 million
in US equity exposure and are therefore not required to report their quarterly holdings to the SEC. In
addition, the sample covers other funds that, given their investment style mandate, do not necessarily have
single-stock exposure. Examples of such funds include fixed income, distressed debt, and macro funds, as
well as commodity trading advisors.
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by problems that spring from the separation of ownership and investment capital. Asset
management firms that are especially prone to short-termist pressures from shareholders un-
derperform more than do firms that are insulated from such pressures. Consistent with the
overall conflicts of interest view, listed management firms with greater separation of own-
ership, control, and investment capital exhibit more acute underperformance. Relative to
funds managed by unlisted firms, those managed by listed firms with low insider ownership
and founders who cashed out underperform more. The conflicts of interest at hedge funds
managed by listed firms translate into a tendency to raise capital by growing the AUM of
new products. These capital raising activities in turn engender underperformance. We show
that funds that have the greatest scope for asset gathering, as a consequence of their low
liquidity risk levels, also exhibit the most severe underperformance. By subscribing to funds
managed by listed firms, investors trade investment performance for lower operational risk.
The empirical results in this paper enrich our understanding of agency forces at work in
the asset management industry. Press coverage on the public listings by asset managers has
alluded to the problems that arise from the separation of control, ownership, and investment
capital. Therefore, do fund investors appreciate and internalize the conflicts of interest that
transpire at publicly-listed asset management firms? We find that some hedge fund investors
appear to do so. In results available upon request, we show that fund of hedge funds
(henceforth FOFs) with high past Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha t-statistics subsequently
outperform FOFs with low past alpha t-statistics. Moreover, the former tend to load up
less on listed hedge funds than do the latter.28 These results provide prima facie evidence
that skilled investors may be cognizant of the conflicts of interest that a✏ict hedge funds
managed by listed firms, and judiciously avoid such funds.
28Specifically, the alpha spread between the top and bottom deciles of FOFs sorted on past two-year alpha
t-statistics and held for one year is 3.12% per annum (t-statistic = 3.17). The loading on the listed hedge
fund portfolio for the FOF decile spread is –0.38 (t-statistic = –3.53).
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Fig 1. Separation of ownership, control, and investment capital when an asset management firm goes public. Typically, a privately held asset management
firm is controlled by its founder-owners, who also invest a substantial percentage of their net worth in the funds managed by the firm. This engenders a
tight alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital. Going public, weakens this alignment as the founders of the firm sell-out to new
shareholders who neither invest alongside the limited partners nor manage the hedge funds run by the firm, leading to the separation of ownership from
control and investment capital. Moreover, the founders may not invest the substantial proceeds from the IPO in the funds managed by the firm, thereby
distancing control from investment capital. The dashed double arrow connectors denote conflicts of interest that impact fund investors.
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Fund managers
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Fig 2. Cumulative abnormal returns of hedge funds managed by listed firms versus hedge funds managed by unlisted firms. Equal-weighted
portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds based on whether they are managed by listed firms. Cumulative abnormal return is the
difference between a portfolio’s excess return and its factor loadings multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. Factor loadings are
estimated over the entire sample period. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. 
Year
Number of 
management 
companies
Number of 
hedge funds
Total AUM 
(US$m)
Number of 
management 
companies
Number of 
hedge funds
Total AUM 
(US$m)
1994 12 39 $2,548 789 1,187 $60,808
1995 20 68 $4,241 886 1,423 $78,583
1996 27 86 $6,822 1,087 1,758 $97,291
1997 32 109 $10,949 1,253 2,069 $138,441
1998 34 100 $11,115 1,366 2,275 $148,410
1999 42 124 $17,539 1,400 2,267 $183,196
2000 49 144 $22,425 1,553 2,590 $210,932
2001 51 156 $27,770 1,682 2,881 $261,629
2002 57 184 $25,256 1,769 3,034 $289,290
2003 65 245 $35,956 1,999 3,522 $421,120
2004 72 295 $53,008 2,215 4,021 $571,768
2005 83 328 $60,948 2,404 4,466 $633,386
2006 100 427 $86,705 2,517 4,652 $834,923
2007 111 523 $123,558 2,567 4,746 $1,041,548
2008 109 451 $75,800 2,362 4,157 $710,135
2009 115 543 $99,171 2,372 4,109 $721,271
2010 110 584 $104,829 2,252 3,915 $811,890
2011 110 700 $125,195 2,047 3,590 $823,782
2012 118 873 $169,988 2,197 3,915 $916,657
2013 113 856 $199,335 2,083 3,662 $995,804
Table 1
Summary statistics
This table reports the number of hedge funds and the total hedge fund assets managed by listed firms and by unlisted firms.
We determine fund management companies' public listing status by leveraging on several sources: S&P Capital IQ, the
SEC's Investment Adviser Public Disclosure website, Factiva, and the fund management companies' websites. Specifically,
for each fund management company, we perform a search in S&P Capital IQ and SEC's Investment Adviser Public
Disclosure, which provide information about the company's current and prior corporate parents. Once we identify a parent
and subsidiary relationship, we obtain the effective public listing date for the fund management company by checking the
"M&A/Private Placements" section in S&P Capital IQ, conducting a Factiva news search, and perusing the corporate history
from the fund management company's website. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
Listed firms Unlisted firms
Portfolio
Excess Return                               
(pct / year)
Alpha                         
(pct / year)
SNPMRF SCMLC BD10RET BAAMTSY PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM Adj. R2
Panel A: All hedge funds
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.29*                                                                                
(2.41)
0.96                                  
(0.90)
0.32**                                
(14.35)
0.13**                        
(4.83)
0.11**                                                         
(2.71)
0.20**                                                                       
(3.99)
-0.01                       
(-1.18)
0.01                                                                     
(1.89)
0.01                        
(0.80)
0.60
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.18**                                                                                
(4.32)
3.86**                                   
(4.95)
0.24**                              
(14.91)
0.14**                        
(6.86)
0.04                                                         
(1.21)
0.17**                                                 
(4.59)
0.00                                           
(-0.79)
0.01**                                                   
(3.56)
0.01*                                            
(2.23)
0.64
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.89**                                                                                
(-3.13)
-2.89**                                   
(-4.73)
0.08**                                              
(6.10)
0.00                                                    
(-0.28)
0.08**                                                      
(3.20)
0.03                                           
(1.13)
0.00                                                 
(-1.06)
0.00                                             
(-1.22)
-0.01                         
(-1.43)
0.22
Panel B: Hedge funds with AUM greater than US$20 million
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 3.94*                                                                                
(2.22)
0.63                                  
(0.62)
0.32**                                
(14.71)
0.11**                        
(4.39)
0.10*                                                                                
(2.34)
0.21**                         
(4.43)
-0.01                       
(-1.76)
0.01                                                                      
(1.88)
0.01                        
(1.16)
0.61
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 5.98**                                                                                
(4.03)
3.59**                                   
(4.54)
0.24**                              
(14.37)
0.14**                        
(7.05)
0.04                                                         
(1.30)
0.18**                                                 
(4.77)
-0.01                       
(-1.51)
0.01**                                                                         
(3.16)
0.01*                       
(2.14)
0.63
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.04**                                                                                
(-3.54)
-2.95**                                   
(-5.46)
0.08**                                              
(7.01)
-0.03                       
(-1.96)
0.05*                                                                           
(2.56)
0.04                       
(1.46)
0.00                                                
(-1.14)
0.00                                              
(-1.04)
0.00                                               
(-0.91)
0.26
Every January, hedge funds are sorted into two portfolios based on whether they are managed by listed firms or by unlisted firms. The post-formation returns on the two portfolios over the next 12 months are linked across
years to form a single return series for each portfolio. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of hedge funds managed by listed firms. Portfolio B is the equal-weighted portfolio of hedge funds managed by unlisted
firms. In Panel A, we report the results for the full sample of hedge funds. In Panel B, we report the results for hedge funds with AUM greater than US$20 million. Hedge fund portfolio performance is estimated relative to
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Russell 2000 return minus S&P 500 return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of
the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for the duration (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS
(PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM). The t-statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. *
Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Portfolio sorts on fund management company listing status
Table 2
Independent variables
LISTED -0.302**                                                                                         
(-18.86)
-0.115**                        
(-6.31)
-0.458**                        
(-21.65)
-0.203**                        
(-8.87)
-0.177**                                 
(-3.38)
-0.084**                        
(-2.97)
-0.290**                        
(-5.53)
-0.196**                        
(-6.13)
MGTFEE (%) 0.042**                                                                                         
(4.04)
0.014                                             
(1.05)
0.042                                                        
(1.81)
0.013                                               
(0.52)
PERFFEE (%) 0.003**                                                                                         
(2.80)
0.011**                                               
(10.05)
0.006                                                      
(1.59)
0.009**                                                 
(3.16)
NOTICE  (months) 0.017**                                                                                         
(7.67)
0.013**                                               
(5.16)
0.021*                                                       
(2.44)
0.017*                                               
(2.31)
MININV (US$m) 0.001**                                                                                         
(2.66)
0.000                                             
(0.87)
0.003                                                        
(1.08)
0.005                                               
(1.80)
log(SIZE) -0.035**                                                                                         
(-11.01)
0.013**                                              
(3.19)
-0.043**                                                                                         
(-3.87)
0.022*                                             
(2.33)
AGE (decades) -0.151**                                                                                         
(-12.14)
-0.085**                                               
(-5.81)
-0.197**                                                        
(-3.94)
-0.131**                                               
(-3.29)
year dummies No Yes No Yes No No No No
strategy dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.000 0.026 0.001 0.010 0.004 0.051 0.004 0.032
No. of observations 834,268 693,145 432,028 376,901 240 240 216 216
This table reports results from multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance. The dependent variables include hedge fund return and alpha.
RETURN is hedge fund monthly net-of-fee return. ALPHA is Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha where factor loadings are
estimated over the last 24 months. The primary independent variable of interest is the listed dummy (LISTED). It takes a value of one if the hedge
fund is managed by a listed firm, and a value of zero otherwise. The other independent variables include hedge fund management fee (MGTFEE),
performance fee (PERFFEE), redemption notice period in months (NOTICE), minimum investment in USD million (MININV), the natural
logarithm of fund size (log(SIZE)) where SIZE is in USD million, fund age in decades (AGE) as well as dummy variables for year and fund
investment strategy. The t-statistics for the OLS regressions are derived from White (1980) standard errors, while the t-statistics for the Fama-
MacBeth regressions are derived from Newey and West (1987) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. *
Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Table 3
Regressions on hedge fund performance
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
OLS Regressions Fama-MacBeth (1973) Regressions
Before After After - Before
Panel A: Hedge fund attributes
Fund alpha (pct / month) - treatment group 1.08 -0.20 -1.28*                                                          
(-4.53)
Fund alpha (pct / month) - control group 0.33 0.18 -0.14                                                                                    
(-1.26)
Difference in alpha (pct / month) 0.76 -0.38 -1.14**                                                                                    
(-3.78)
Fund AUM (US$m) - treatment group 201.95 346.08 144.12**                                                                                    
(10.10)
Fund AUM (US$m) - control group 246.33 460.26 213.93**                                                                                    
(14.90)
Difference in AUM (US$m) -44.38 -114.18 -69.80**                                                                                    
(-8.33)
Panel B: Fund management company attributes
Firm alpha (pct / month) - treatment group 0.68 -0.09 -0.77**                                                                                    
(-4.81)
Firm alpha (pct / month) - control group 0.31 0.20 -0.11                                                                                    
(-1.07)
Difference in alpha (pct / month) 0.37 -0.29 -0.67**                                                                                    
(-3.72)
Firm AUM (US$m) - treatment group 554.44 1415.42 860.97**                                                                                    
(16.40)
Firm AUM (US$m) - control group 587.00 1107.02 520.02**                                                                                    
(16.26)
Difference in AUM (US$m) -32.56 308.40 340.95**                                                                                    
(6.48)
Firm fee revenue (US$m / month) - treatment group 1.96 3.27 1.30**                                                                                    
(12.08)
Firm fee revenue (US$m / month) - control group 2.09 2.86 0.77**                                                                                    
(5.26)
Difference in fee revenue (US$m / month) -0.13 0.41 0.53**                                                                                    
(3.96)
Firm number of funds - treatment group 3.34 6.37 3.04**                                                                                                                                          
(28.62)
Firm number of funds - control group 3.35 3.62 0.27*                                                                                               
(2.09)
Difference in number of funds -0.01 2.75 2.77**                                                                                    
(17.37)
Table 4
Event study with differences-in-differences analysis
This table reports results from an event study analysis of hedge fund and firm attributes around fund management
company's public listing date. Alpha is Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha where factor loadings are
estimated over the last 24 months. Event month is the month that the fund management company completes its initial
public offering (IPO). The period "before" is the 60-month period before the event month and the period "after" is the 60-
month period after the event month. To be included in the analysis, a hedge fund or a hedge fund management company
must survive at least 24 months before and after the event month. Funds/firms in the control group are matched to
funds/firms in the treatment group based on fund alpha, fund AUM, firm alpha, firm AUM, firm fee revenue or the
number of funds managed by the firm in the 24-month pre-event period. For example, in the fund alpha analysis, funds in
the control group are matched to funds in the treatment group by minimizing the sum of the absolute percentage
differences in monthly fund alpha in the 24-month pre-event period. Panel A reports results at hedge fund level, while
Panel B reports results at the fund management company level. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Independent variables
0.210** 0.201*
(2.94) (2.43)
0.001
(0.36)
0.003
(0.80)
0.089** 0.086**
(12.77) (12.54)
-0.000 0.002
(-1.11) (0.67)
0.030 0.037
(1.33) (1.31)
0.001 0.002
(0.40) (0.61)
-0.039** -0.032**
(-5.53) (-4.10)
-0.000 -0.003
(-1.31) (-1.48)
-0.319** -0.295**
(-8.80) (-7.25)
0.136** 0.144**
(14.89) (13.31)
0.001 0.005
(0.20) (0.61)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.124 0.139
No. of observations 26,697 19,227
RETSTD (%)
PERFFEE (%)
NOTICE  (months)
MININV (US$m)
AGE (decades)
log(SIZE)
RETURN (%)
ALPHA (%)
NFUNDS
FLOW
MGTFEE (%)
Table 5
Probit model on launching new funds
This table reports results from two probit regressions that model the probability of launching new
funds for listed and unlisted hedge fund management companies. The dependent variable
(NEWFUNDLAUNCH) takes a value of one if the manager launches at least one new fund in the
year, and a value of zero otherwise. All the independent variables are taken from previous year end.
The primary independent variable of interest is the listed dummy (LISTED). It takes a value of one
if the hedge fund management company is a listed firm, and a value of zero otherwise. The other
independent variables include hedge fund firm net-of-fee return from the previous year (RETURN),
hedge fund firm rolling alpha from the previous year (ALPHA), the number of hedge funds
managed by the management company in the previous year (NFUNDS), fund flow to the fund
management company in the previous year (FLOW), firm management fee (MGTFEE), firm
performance fee (PERFFEE), firm redemption notice period in months (NOTICE), firm minimum
investment in USD million (MININV), natural logarithm of firm size (log(SIZE)) where SIZE is in
USD million, firm age in decades (AGE), standard deviation of firm returns in the previous year
(RETSTD) as well as year dummies. Firm level metrics such as management fee are constructed by
value-weighting the fund level metrics for all funds managed by the firm. The robust z-statistics
with standard errors clustered by manager are in parentheses. The sample period is from January
1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable = NEWFUNDLAUNCH
LISTED 
Table 6
Portfolio
Panel A: Sort on managerial total delta scaled by fund AUM Low High Low High
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 3.89                                                      
(1.83)
6.02**                           
(3.14)
0.38                      
(0.31)
3.03**                          
(2.49)
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.56**                                                       
(4.25)
6.44**                        
(3.71)
4.29**                        
(5.16)
3.90**                        
(4.20)
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.67**                                                       
(-3.46)
-0.42                      
(-0.72)
-3.90**                          
(-6.44)
-0.87                      
(-1.42)
Panel B: Sort on fund aggregate governance score Low High Low High
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 1.18                                                          
(0.59)
6.88**                          
(3.78)
-1.79                       
(-1.04)
3.93**                         
(4.49)
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 4.62**                                                          
(2.78)
7.65**                        
(4.24)
1.87                      
(1.53)
5.21**                          
(6.98)
Spread portfolio (A - B) -3.43**                                                          
(-3.18)
-0.77                      
(-1.31)
-3.66**                          
(-3.47)
-1.28*                       
(-2.08)
Panel C: Sort on fund managers' personal capital No Yes No Yes
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.38                                                           
(1.50)
6.99**                          
(3.31)
-0.88                     
(-0.39)
4.01**                          
(2.73)
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.89**                                                           
(2.81)
8.51**                        
(3.54)
2.74                     
(1.87)
4.56**                           
(3.72)
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.51*                                                           
(-2.32)
-1.52                       
(-1.35)
-3.62**                          
(-3.00)
-0.55                      
(-0.61)
Panel D: Listed firms sorted by level of insider ownership Low High Low High
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 3.60                                                                                                                                                 
(1.03)
7.24                        
(1.10)
0.42                        
(0.21)
3.04                        
(0.87)
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 5.28                                                                                                                                                 
(1.67)
5.28                        
(1.67)
2.99                        
(1.91)
2.99                        
(1.91)
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.69                                                                                                                                                 
(-1.97)
1.96                       
(0.54)
-2.58**                           
(-3.16)
0.05                     
(0.02)
Panel E: Listed firms sorted by proportion of closely held shares Low High Low High
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 3.74*                                                                                                                                                                     
(2.03)
5.48*                        
(2.46)
0.58                       
(0.51)
1.71                        
(1.25)
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.53**                                                                                                                                                                     
(4.20)
6.53**                        
(4.20)
4.02**                        
(4.86)
4.02**                        
(4.86)
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.79**                                                                                                                                                                     
(-4.19)
-1.05                      
(-0.99)
-3.44**                          
(-5.07)
-2.31**                        
(-2.67)
Panel F: Listed firms sorted by whether existing shareholders cashed out Yes No Yes No
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 3.48                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
(0.74)
4.90                        
(1.85)
-1.50                         
(-0.58)
2.80*                        
(2.35)
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 5.60                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
(1.97)
5.60                        
(1.97)
3.08*                         
(2.09)
3.08*                        
(2.09)
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.12                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
(-0.94)
-0.71                        
(-0.86)
-4.58**                          
(-2.86)
-0.27                      
(-0.35)
Portfolio sorts on fund management company listing status and conflicts of interests
This table reports double sorts on firm listing status and fund or firm agency proxies. In Panel A, hedge funds are first sorted into two
groups based on fund manager total delta scaled by fund assets under management (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2009). In Panel B, hedge 
funds are first sorted into two groups based on their aggregate governance scores (Ozik and Sadka, 2015). As per Ozik and Sadka
(2015), high aggregate governance funds are funds with aggregate governance scores ≥ 4 (out of 5), while low aggregate governance
funds are funds with aggregate governance scores ≤ 1 (out of 5). In Panel C, hedge funds are first sorted into two groups based on
whether the hedge fund manager co-invests in the fund, as measured by the personal capital dummy from the TASS database. Next,
funds within each agency metric group are stratified into two portfolios by their fund management company listing status. Portfolio A is
the portfolio of hedge funds managed by listed firms. Portfolio B is the portfolio of hedge funds managed by unlisted firms. In Panels D
and E, hedge funds managed by listed firms are sorted based on the level of insider ownership and the number of closely held shares as
a proportion of total shares outstanding, respectively. In Panel F, hedge funds managed by listed firms are sorted based on whether their
IPO prospectuses reveal that existing shareholders are cashing out. Information on the level of insider ownership is obtained for listed
firms from their Form ADV Schedule A and B filings. Information on the number of closely held shares is obtained from Datastream.
IPO prospectuses are obtained from the Perfect Information filings database. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2013. However, the effective sample period differs across panels as we also require that each portfolio has at least ten funds. *
Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
AlphaExcess return
Portfolio
Excess Return                               
(pct / year)
Alpha                         
(pct / year)
SNPMRF SCMLC BD10RET BAAMTSY PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM Adj. R2
Portfolio A1 (hedge funds managed by listed firms with high ERC)
2.70                                                                                           
(1.45)
0.95                                   
(0.94)
0.27**                                
(12.66)
0.06*                          
(2.22)
0.05                                                                     
(1.31)
0.11*                                               
(2.59)
-0.01                        
(-1.48)
0.01                                               
(1.59)
0.01                        
(0.83)
0.62
Portfolio A2 (hedge funds managed by listed firms with low ERC)
4.91**                                                                                           
(3.27)
3.10**                                   
(3.17)
0.16**                              
(8.01)
0.12**                            
(4.80)
0.04                                                                    
(1.02)
0.14**                                                 
(3.36)
-0.01                       
(-1.02)
0.00                                                                       
(0.27)
0.00                        
(-0.59)
0.53
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms)
5.87**                                                                                           
(3.19)
3.63**                                   
(3.62)
0.25**                              
(11.69)
0.13**                            
(5.07)
0.06                                                                    
(1.58)
0.16**                                                 
(3.88)
-0.01                       
(-1.95)
0.02**                                                                         
(2.99)
0.01                      
(1.19)
0.64
Spread portfolio (A1 - B)
-3.17**                                                                                           
(-3.39)
-2.68**                                   
(-3.13)
0.02                                                         
(1.28)
-0.07**                           
(-3.31)
-0.01                                       
(-0.30)
-0.05                                                                      
(-1.48)
0.00                                               
(0.53)
-0.01                         
(-1.62)
0.00                                                                      
(-0.41)
0.07
Spread portfolio (A2 - B)
-0.96                                                                                           
(-1.10)
-0.53                                   
(-0.77)
-0.08**                                
(-5.68)
-0.01                          
(-0.58)
-0.02                                                                      
(-0.86)
-0.03                                             
(-0.89)
0.01                                               
(1.39)
-0.01**                           
(-3.97)
-0.01*                       
(-2.57)
0.26
Spread portfolio (A1 - A2)
-2.21                                                                                           
(-1.77)
-2.15*                                    
(-2.02)
0.10**                                                        
(4.70)
-0.06*                        
(-2.29)
0.01                                                                           
(0.31)
-0.03                         
(-0.62)
0.00                                                                     
(-0.47)
0.01                        
(1.26)
0.01                                               
(1.33)
0.12
Table 7
Portfolio sorts on fund management company listing status and stock earnings response coefficient (ERC)
Every January, hedge funds are sorted into two groups based on whether they are managed by listed firms or unlisted firms. Portfolio A is the portfolio of hedge funds managed by listed firms. Portfolio B is the portfolio of hedge
funds managed by unlisted firms. The hedge funds in portfolio A are further sorted into two portfolios (A1 and A2) based on firm earnings response coefficient (ERC) as in Easton and Zmijewski (1989). ERC measures the
sensitivity of stock returns to firm earnings. ERCs are computed from individual firm level regressions over the full sample period for firms with at least eight quarters of information. Hedge fund portfolio performance is
estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Russell 2000 return minus S&P 500 return (SCMLC), change in the constant
maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for the duration (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY),
bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM). The t-statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 2000 to December
2013, which corresponds to the period where there are at least ten funds in each of the high and low ERC portfolios. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Portfolio 1 (low beta) 2 3 4 5 (high beta) 1 (low beta) 2 3 4 5 (high beta)
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 0.07                                                                                    
(0.03)
3.23                      
(1.81)
2.24                     
(1.54)
4.34*                      
(2.57)
5.20                     
(1.63)
-3.61                                                     
(-1.90)
0.25                                                     
(0.21)
-0.05                                          
(-0.06)
1.88                                         
(1.59)
0.82                      
(0.38)
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 5.60**                                                                                    
(3.47)
5.04**                      
(3.89)
4.81**                     
(4.05)
5.26**                     
(3.56)
6.33**                      
(3.33)
3.05**                                
(2.72)
2.88**                      
(3.80)
2.87**                     
(5.01)
2.99**                     
(4.25)
3.71**                      
(3.39)
Spread portfolio (A - B) -5.53**                                                                                    
(-3.20)
-1.82*                     
(-2.08)
-2.57**                      
(-4.24)
-0.92                   
(-0.91)
-1.12                      
(-0.53)
-6.66**                                  
(-4.81)
-2.63**                      
(-3.24)
-2.91**                     
(-5.33)
-1.11                   
(-1.04)
-2.89                      
(-1.64)
Excess return Alpha
Table 8
Portfolio sorts on Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta and hedge fund management company public listing status
This table reports double sorts on Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) fund liquidity beta and firm listing status. Every January, hedge funds are first sorted into quintiles based on their beta with
respect to the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate liquidity measure. Liquidity beta is estimated over the past 24 months in the presence of factors from Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.
Next, within each liquidity beta group, hedge funds are sorted into two portfolios based on fund management company listing status. The post-formation returns on the resultant ten portfolios
over the next 12 months are linked across years to form a single return series for each portfolio. Hedge fund performance is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. The Fung
and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Russell 2000 return minus S&P 500 return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration
(BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM). The coefficient estimates on these variables are omitted for brevity. The t-statistics, 
derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Sort on Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta
Hedge fund performance flag
Hedge funds 
managed by 
listed firms
Hedge funds 
managed by 
unlisted firms
Difference 
(listed - unlisted)
Kink 25.2% 28.7% -3.6%**
Maxrsq 46.3% 40.1% 6.2%
% Negative 19.6% 22.8% -3.2%**
% Repeat 32.6% 40.3% -7.7%**
This table reports the percentage of hedge funds that trigger various performance flags at the 10%
significance level, sorted on fund management company listing status. The performance flags analyzed
include the four performance flags with the highest rejection rates for reporting violations in Bollen
and Pool (2012). The four performance flags are Kink, Maxrsq, % Negative, and % Repeat. Kink is
triggered when a fund reports a return distribution with a discontinuity at zero. Maxrsq is triggered
when a fund delivers an adjusted R-squared that is not significantly different from zero. % Negative is
triggered when a fund reports a low number of negative returns. % Repeat is triggered when a fund
reports a high number of repeated returns. We test the difference in rejection frequencies for hedge
funds managed by listed firms and those managed by unlisted firms. The sample period is from
January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Performance flag trigger frequency
Table 9
Bollen and Pool (2012) hedge fund performance flag trigger frequencies
Dependent variables LISTED RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
IV first stage (probit)
-1.824** -2.767** -0.144** -0.191**
(-4.45) (-6.66) (-2.79) (-3.35)
-0.021* 0.033* 0.022 0.036* 0.026
(-2.01) (2.35) (1.43) (2.56) (1.73)
0.023** 0.001 0.012** 0.000 0.010**
(19.96) (1.15) (9.45) (0.26) (8.24)
-0.130** 0.007* 0.005 0.011** 0.012**
(-23.04) (2.30) (1.67) (4.06) (4.20)
-0.040** -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004*
(-3.15) (-0.59) (0.54) (0.63) (2.33)
-0.339** -0.092** -0.116** -0.072** -0.085**
(-24.01) (-5.58) (-6.88) (-4.56) (-5.31)
0.167** 0.018** 0.029** 0.006 0.011**
(40.31) (3.69) (5.73) (1.50) (2.58)
0.035**
(5.22)
F-test: STRATEGYFLOW = 0 27.30**
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
strategy dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.111
R-squared 0.031 0.002
Adj. R-squared 0.034 0.009
No. of observations 321,597 321,597 321,597 321,597 321,597
STRATEGYFLOW
MGTFEE (%)
PERFFEE (%)
NOTICE  (months)
MININV (US$m)
log(SIZE)
AGE (decades)
LISTED 
Table 10
Instrumental variable analysis
This table reports results from regressions that use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to examine whether the observed differences in hedge fund performance between listed and
unlisted hedge fund firms reflect unobserved differences that endogenously determine listing status. Our instrument for listing status exploits the cross sectional differences in hedge fund
managers' ability to accumulate capital at the time of founding. We define hedge fund management company founding strategy fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW) as fund manager's strategy
fund flow over the 24-month period after inception. The strategy used in STRATEGYFLOW corresponds to the investment strategy of the first fund launched by the firm. We exclude all
listed hedge fund firms that go public less than two years after inception. Column 1 shows the first stage probit model of hedge fund listing status on hedge fund management company
founding strategy fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW) and the group of control variables used in Table 3. The dependent variable is the listed dummy (LISTED). It takes a value of one if the
hedge fund management company is a listed firm, and a value of zero otherwise. The independent variables include hedge fund management fee (MGTFEE), performance fee (PERFFEE),
redemption notice period in months (NOTICE), minimum investment in USD million (MININV), the natural logarithm of fund size (log(SIZE)) where SIZE is in USD million, fund age in
decades (AGE) as well as dummy variables for year and fund investment strategy. Following Wooldridge (2002), the second stage is estimated by GMM using as instruments the first-stage
predicted probability. Column 2 and 3 show the second stage results, where the dependent variables are RETURN and ALPHA. RETURN is hedge fund monthly net-of-fee return. ALPHA is
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. For comparison, columns 4 and 5 report results from regressions analogous
to those reported in columns 2 and 3 but without instrumenting for hedge fund listing status. In columns 1, 2, and 3, robust z-statistics are in parentheses. In columns 4 and 5, t-statistics
derived from White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
IV second stage OLS
Portfolio
Excess Return                      
(pct / year)
Alpha                                         
(pct / year)
Adj. R2 Portfolio
Excess Return                      
(pct / year)
Alpha                                         
(pct / year)
Adj. R2
Panel A: Adjusted for backfill bias Panel G: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 2.47                                                 
(1.31)
-0.62                                 
(-0.53)
0.55 Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.29*                                                 
(2.41)
0.93                               
(0.80)
0.60
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 4.79**                                                 
(2.87)
2.18**                                
(2.68)
0.70 Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.18**                                                 
(4.32)
4.28**                                
(5.10)
0.64
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.32**                                                 
(-3.00)
-2.80**                                
(-3.71)
0.05 Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.89**                                                 
(-3.13)
-3.35**                                
(-5.10)
0.23
Panel B: Adjusted for serial correlation Panel H: Adjusted for fund termination
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.29*                                                 
(2.41)
0.96                               
(0.87)
0.60 Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 2.84                                                 
(1.61)
-0.40                                 
(-0.38)
0.59
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.18**                                                 
(4.32)
3.86**                                
(4.93)
0.64 Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 4.61**                                                 
(3.23)
2.31**                                
(3.00)
0.64
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.89**                                                 
(-3.13)
-2.89**                                
(-5.18)
0.22 Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.77**                                                 
(-2.95)
-2.72**                                
(-4.45)
0.21
Panel C: Pre-fee returns Panel I: Sub-sample analysis (January 1994 - December 2003)
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 7.15**                                                 
(3.95)
3.83**                                
(3.70)
0.62 Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.46*                                                 
(2.44)
1.58                               
(1.59)
0.72
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 9.79**                                                 
(6.66)
7.47**                                
(9.34)
0.63 Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.59**                                                 
(4.15)
4.55**                                
(5.25)
0.69
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.64**                                                 
(-4.55)
-3.64**                                
(-6.43)
0.24 Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.12**                                                 
(-2.94)
-2.97**                                
(-3.63)
0.21
Panel D: Adjusted for dynamic risk exposures using 24-month rolling betas Panel J: Sub-sample analysis (January 2004 - December 2013)
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.49*                                                 
(2.32)
0.02                               
(0.02)
n.a. Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.11                                                 
(1.35)
-0.25                                 
(-0.13)
0.57
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.53**                                                 
(4.20)
3.44**                                
(3.69)
n.a. Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 5.77*                                                 
(2.43)
2.82*                                
(2.22)
0.66
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.05**                                                 
(-3.31)
-3.42**                                
(-4.92)
n.a. Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.66                                                                                                  
(-1.71)
-3.07**                                  
(-3.17)
0.21
Panel E: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with an emerging markets equity factor Panel K: Management company level returns
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.29*                                                 
(2.41)
1.68                               
(1.93)
0.74 Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.78**                                                                                    
(2.86)
1.74                              
(1.83)
0.62
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.18**                                                 
(4.32)
4.32**                                
(6.45)
0.73 Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.78**                                                                                    
(4.75)
4.47**                                
(6.16)
0.68
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.89**                                                 
(-3.13)
-2.64**                                
(-4.61)
0.32 Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.01**                                                                                    
(-3.59)
-2.73**                                
(-5.49)
0.21
Panel F: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with the Agarwal and Naik (2004) out-of-the money call and put option factors Panel L: Management company returns constructed from 13F stock holdings
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 4.29*                                                 
(2.41)
2.46*                                
(2.41)
0.66 Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by listed firms) 9.19*                                                                                            
(2.28)
1.56                               
(1.83)
0.88
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 6.18**                                                 
(4.32)
4.56**                                
(5.16)
0.63 Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by unlisted firms) 12.01**                                                                                            
(2.61)
3.73**                               
(3.85)
0.95
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.89**                                                 
(-3.13)
-2.10**                                
(-3.51)
0.25 Spread portfolio (A - B) -4.67*                                                                                            
(-1.94)
-2.17*                                
(-2.36)
0.38
Table 11
Robustness tests
This table reports robustness tests on the baseline portfolio sorts. Every January, hedge funds are sorted into two portfolios based on whether they are managed by listed firms or by unlisted firms. The post-formation returns on these two portfolios over the next 12
months are linked across years to form a single return series for each portfolio. Portfolio A is the portfolio of hedge funds managed by listed firms. Portfolio B is the portfolio of hedge funds managed by unlisted firms. Panel A reports results adjusted for backfill
bias by removing the return observations before fund listing date. Panel B reports results after unsmoothing returns using the Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) algorithm. Panel C reports results after adding back fees to form pre-fee returns. Panel D reports
results adjusted for dynamic risk exposures by using a rolling 24-month window to calculate factor loadings. Panel E reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the MSCI Emerging Market Index excess return. Panel F reports results
after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the Agarwal and Naik (2004) out-of-the money call and put option factors. Panel G reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor.
Panel H adjusts for fund termination by assuming that a fund delivers a -10 percent return for the month after it liquidates. Panels I and J report results for two sub-sample periods: January 1994 to December 2003 and January 2004 to December 2013, respectively.
Panel K reports results from the portfolio sort analysis at the firm level with firm returns. Panel L reports results with firm returns computed from Thomson Financial 13F stock holdings. The t-statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses.
The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
